Hodža-Bartha etnikai határ a megoldás

2011.05.21.
Hodža-Bartha etnikai határ a megoldás bajainkra, megoldás a szlovák-magyar megbékélésre.

Autonómia témában már régen fogalmaztam meg a nézeteimet és ezért úgy döntöttem egy kicsit visszatérek a múltba, az eltelt hat évben történtekre, fölvidéki autonómia ügyben. Nem azért, hogy okokat keressek a nemakarásunkra, mert a víz folyását nem lehet megváltoztatni, az mindig a saját medrében köt ki. Inkább azért, hogy egy kicsit konkrétabban elemezzem a lehetőségeinket és a lehetséges törésvonalakat, kitörési mechanizmusainkat, abból a tehetetlenségi, kilátástalansági állapotból, amiben már a magyarság, benne a felvidéki magyarság is szenved lassan 100 éve. Talán maradjunk az eltelt 21 év történéseinél és a felvidéki magyarságnál. Ennek keretein belül is inkább az eltelt hat évet elemezném az autonómia jogosságának a szemszögéből.

A felvidéki magyarság semmivel sem rosszabb, semmivel sem megalkuvóbb, semmivel sem kevésbé akarja az autonómiát, mint az összes magyar nemzetrész a Kárpát-medencében.

Az eltelt hat éveben felvidéki viszonylatokban, autonómia témában történt egy lényeges áttörés, manapság már mindenki bizonyos szinten beszél az autonómiáról, vannak akik támogatják, vannak akik ellenzik. Egy biztos tabutémából, megmaradási téma lett.

Ilyenkor kell feltenni egy fontos kérdést. Miért nem egyesült erővel küzdünk az azonos jogainkért és az ehhez szükséges területi autonómiáért. Mai pénzorientált társadalmunkban, amikor a becsület, az erkölcs és a bátorság csak internetes fórumozás és kocsmai szinten téma, de kint az utcán, a hivatalokban, az igazmondás szintjén már félelmet kelt bennünk, akkor bizony nagyon nehéz egyről-kettőre jutni megmaradási témában.

Írásaimban igyekeztem felvázolni azokat az okokat és lehetőségeket, amelyek fékező hatással és gátló tényezőként működnek jogaink békés kikövetelésének az útvonalán, mindig konkrétan és más hasonló sorsú közösségek tapasztalataiból leszűrtek alapján hoztam meg a saját javaslataimat.

Ilyen az autonómia tervezetem is, ami 2007 óta kész, azóta várom a tárgyilagos hozzászólásokat javaslatokat. Elképzeléseim lényege az volt, hogy a területi autonómia jogos és alkotmányos követelés, ami ahol létrehozták egy nagyon jó konfliktus megelőző eszközként működik. Most nem akarom elemezni az MKP és az új párt a Híd szerepét abban, hogy miért nem indítottak el egy békés mozgalmat a megmaradásunk egyedüli zálogáért az autonómiáért. Több írásomban is megindokoltam, talán, ha egy mondatban akarnám összegezni azt mondanám, hogy a hatalomba való való törtetésük fontosabb volt, az számukra, mint a felvidéki magyarság asszimilációjának a megállítása.

Most visszatérek a lehetőségekhez és a hogyanokhoz. Dél-Tirolnak van területi autonómiája, mert egységesen követelték azt és sikeresen ki is vívták az azonos jogaikat, a jogegyenlőséget. Azóta megállt az asszimilációjuk, lélekszámban is gyarapodnak.

Mi fölvidéki magyarok meg csökkenünk asszimilálódunk, élszórványősodúnk., majd ha ez a folyamat nem lesz megfordítva teljesen eltűnünk, beolvadunk a többségi nemzetbe.

Hogyan lehet ezt megelőzni? Látszatra egyszerű a megoldás, az is, egy olyan nemzet, vagy nemzetrész esetében, ahol a politikusaik egységre és a megmaradásra törekednek ott meg is maradnak. Vajon a felvidéki magyarság meg akar maradni? Ha igen, akkor békés autonómia küzdelem a megoldás a bajainkra. Ehhez nyújt segítséget, a hogyanokra ad választ a Commora Aula autonómia tervezete. Ez a tervezet négy éve kész olvasható a CA honlapján. A mai napig egyetlen egy tárgyilagos választ nem kaptam miért megvalósíthatatlan. Csupán egyes az MKP-hoz és a Hídhoz köthető egyének véleményezték úgy, hogy hülyeség az egész, de miértekre már nem futotta.

Minden autonómia küzdelem az akarat szintjén dől el és azon, hogy milyen taktikát és megoldásokat választunk a békés küzdelmünkhöz. Most szeretnék egy-két megoldást felvázolni, hogyan is kéne kezdeni, majd folytatni.

Valójában a küzdelem már elkezdődött az emberi agyakban már pár éve folyik a zavarodottság szintjén. Ez rendben is van, mert egy nemzetrész, amely 91 éve alussza csipkerózsika álmát, képtelen egyik napról a másikra a tagadás szikes útvonaláról a sikeres küzdelem és a bátor kiállások termő talajára lépni.

Először is azoknak, akik hisznek az alkotmányos jogegyenlőségben és a viszonosság elvében, azoknak egyesülniük kéne, egy minimális szintű platformon, ami az asszimiláció megállítását és az alkotmányos jogegyenlőség békés kikövetelését tűzné ki célul az ehhez szükséges autonómia segítségével.

Létre kell hozni a Felvidéki Autonómia Tanácsot, meg kell választani annak szerveit és hathatós küzdelmet kell indítani a sikerért, a területi autonómiáért.


Most visszatérnék egy kicsit a Hodzsa-Bartha féle szerződéshez, mert ez egy jó kiinduló pont lehetne a FAT békés küzdelméhez.

Előzmények:

Az alakuló csehszlovák állam és Magyarország között rövid ideig (1918. nov. 28-dec. 6.) tárgyalás folyik Szlovákia déli határáról. Ennek során Milan Hodža, a csehszlovák kormány megbízottja a térképen jelzett "Tót Impériumnak" kulturális és közigazgatási autonómiát, valamint kormányzati kondominiumot kilátásba helyező Jászi Oszkárral tárgyal.



A szlovák-magyar tárgyalások 15 vármegyét érintenek - köztük a 10 szlovák többségűt (Trencsén, Liptó, Zólyom, Árva, Nyitra, Turóc, Sáros, Szepes, Bars, Pozsony) -, amelyek 1.995,0 ezer lakosának 76,5 %-a szlovák, 11,9 %-a magyar, 6,8 %-a német és 2,3 %-a rutén.

A 15-ből öt szlovák többségű megye - Árva (75,0 % szlovák), Liptó (89,9 %), Trencsén (91,7 %), Turóc (69,0 %) és Zólyom (84,8 %) - teljes egészében szlovák fennhatóság alá kerül. Lényegében szlovák kézre kerül három megye: Érsekújvár és egy járás kivételével Nyitra (71,0 % szlovák, 21,9 % magyar), egy járás kivételével Sáros (58,3 % szlovák, 22,0 % rutén, 10,4 % magyar), Gölnicbánya és járása kivételével Szepes (56,2 % szlovák, 22,2 % magyar, 10,8 % német). Részben kerül szlovák kézre hét megye: Pozsonyból (49,5 % szlovák, 42,3 % magyar) 3 járás - de maga Pozsony városa (41,9 % német, 40,5 % magyar, 14,9 % szlovák) magyar kézen marad -, Barsból (54,8 % szlovák, 34,7 % magyar) három járás (valamint Újbánya és Körmöcbánya városok), Hontból (57,0 % magyar, 36,8 % szlovák) két járás (valamint Korpona, Selmecbánya és Bélabánya), Nógrádból (75,6 % magyar, 22,3 % szlovák) a két északi járás, Gömör-Kishontból (58,5 % magyar, 38,4 % szlovák) 4 járás (valamint Nagyrőce és Jolsva), Zemplénből (56,5 % magyar, 27,1 % szlovák) a 4 északi járás, Ungból (38,1 % rutén, 33,2 % magyar, 22,4 % szlovák) a Szobránci járás kerül Szlovákiához. Teljesen magyar kézen marad Abauj-Torna (78,0 % magyar, 18,7 % szlovák) Kassával (75,4 % magyar, 14,8 % szlovák).

Összesen 67 járás és egy sor város (Nagyszombat, Nyitra, Trencsén, Zsolna, Körmöcbánya, Selmecbánya, Besztercebánya, Zólyom, Poprád, Lőcse, Igló, Bártfa, Eperjes, Késmárk, Pöstyén, stb.) tartozik Szlovenszkóhoz.

A tárgyalás során Pozsony és Kassa hovatartozása mellett problémát jelentenek a nyelvhatár alatti szlovák szigetek (Hont, Nógrád, Borsod, Abauj-Torna, Zemplén megyében).

A prágai kormány ellenállása miatt a megegyezés végeredményben kudarcba fullad. A december 6-án a demarkációs vonalról aláírt Hodza-Bartha megállapodás - amely Pozsony fölül indulva nagyjából az etnikai határt követve Kassa fölött halad az Ungig, s ott északra fordulva éri el a magyar határt - hamar érvényét veszti, amikor december 23-án megérkezik a "Szlovákország történelmi határait" kijelölő antant-jegyzék.

A trianoni békével végül 48,4 ezer km2 (9 megye egészében és 8 részben) kerül Csehszlovákiához 2.883,7 ezer lakossal, amelynek 28,2 %-a magyar.

Ennyit a történelemóra gyanánt.

Most gyorsan térjünk vissza a jelenbe. A Hodzsa-Bartha szerződés kijelölte azt az etnikai határvonalat a két nép, a szlovák és a magyar között, ami békességhez nem pedig háborúskodáshoz vezetett volna. Az, hogy a határvonal úgy ahogyan ki lett jelölve az okozója a 91 éves ellentéteknek. Ezért ezen a határvonalon, pontosabban az etnikai határvonal és a mai politikai határ közötti területen létre kell hozni egy két, vagy többnyelvű autonóm területet.

Kétnyelvű és szabad autonóm területet a Hodža-Bartha etnikai határ alatt.

A mindenféle pótcselekvések, a status quo-k már nem megoldás. Mindezek csakis a felvidéki magyarság pusztulásához vezethet.

Bósza János

Hodža-Bartha demarcation line

A Case Study on Trianon

Hodža-Bartha demarcation line
The latter tried to secure Slovakia for Hungary, while Hodza's task was to make Slovakia safe for Czecho-Slovakia. The country was still in the throes of revolution, the situation was uncertain and fluid, and Hodza and Jaszi may not have realized that the center of gravity was Paris, not Budapest or Prague, and that the victors would, eventually, make binding decisions.

In the agreement of November 27 that Hodza made with Jaszi, the latter was willing to give Slovaks an autonomous status, that is administrative and police powers within Slovakia if that province would remain within the confines of the Hungarian state. The administrative self-government would be vested in the Slovak National Council. The two parties, however, had some doubts about the feasibility of an arrangement by which the Slovaks would have control over schools and internal administration of a territory that would not include Bratislava (Pozsony, Pressburg) and Kosice (Kassa, Kaschau).34 On November 29 the Slovak delegates decided to continue informal discussions only with the consent of the government in Prague. One delegate, Matus Dula, chairman of the Slovak National Council, was sent to Prague to report directly on the progress of the talks and to give a more detailed explanation of the Hodza memorandum on the November 27 agreement. The Prague government rejected the Hodza report, especially the definition of Slovakia and its more or less ethnic boundary, which was deemed unacceptable for economic and security reasons.

It would seem that both sides were temporizing, attempting to gain advantage by the discussions in Budapest so that they would have a better bargaining position at the peace conference later on. As it happened, time worked for (and of course the French government favored) the Czecho-Slovak cause.

Since the Eastern Front, which reached into Hungary, was under French command and a French officer was the Allied representative in Budapest who was in charge of the execution of the armistice agreement, for all practical purposes Hungary was under French control. Therefore, when the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs approved of the military line of demarcation in northern Hungary that had been agreed upon between Foch and Benes, the Hungarian troops were required to evacuate the Slovak territory.35 The boundary drawn by Benes was delimited by the Danube river up to the mouth of the river Ipel' (Eipel) from which point it was to follow the Ipel' up to the town of Rimavska Sobota (Rimaszombat), then go

straight to the river Uz (Uh) and along its course up to the Galician boundary.36 The line resembled the one found on Masaryk's wartime sketches, for it too provided access to the Danube.

The French decision, made without securing the approval of the other Allies, was communicated to the Hungarian government by Lieutenant-Colonel Fernand Vix, French representative in Budapest. On December 3, Vix related to Hodza that the Allies recognized the Czecho-Slovak state and that the latter is entitled to occupy the Slovak territory. At the same time Vix urged the Hungarian government to recall, without delay, its troops from the Slovak territory.37 The Hungarian government, however, refused to evacuate the "Slovak land," insisting that no such territorial or administrative unit existed and, therefore, the Hungarian troops could not evacuate it. The difficulty with the communication from Paris to Vix and the latter's note to Karolyi was that it did not contain any demarcation line between Slovakia and Hungary. Therefore, Hodza hastily agreed with the Hungarian government upon a provisional line-the Danube--Lucenec--Cop.38

Acknowledging that the determination of the demarcation line was within the competence of military authorities, Hodza discussed with the Hungarian Minister of War, Albert Bartha, an agreement that was signed on December 6. For Hodza the demarcation line was provisional, while the Hungarians wanted now a definite boundary, realizing that Paris would be more accommodating to the Czechs. From the Slovak point of view the demarcation line of December 6 was highly unfavorable, since it was based on the Hodza-Jaszi agreement of the preceding month. The agreement stipulated that Hungary evacuate most of the indisputably Slovak districts, but leave the districts of southern Slovakia, including the cities of Bratislava and Kosice, inside Hungary. The Hodza-made agreement was concluded without the knowledge and approval of the Prague government and was communicated to Vix who forwarded it to Paris.39

Realizing their situation, the Hungarian government was satisfied with the agreement and demanded its acceptance as definite. But the Czecho-Slovak government rejected it as unacceptable and demanded a new and more favorable demarcation line that would be in accord with the one contained in the Benes-Foch agreement made in Paris in November. The French government's main objection to the Hodza-Bartha agreement was that the Czechs did not follow the

French policy of non-recognition when they sent a representative to Budapest to negotiate issues which only the Allies were competent to decide.40 Benes, therefore, communicated the French position to the Prague government and the latter immediately dissociated itself from Hodza's negotiations.41 He also arranged that Marshal Foch communicate to the Hungarian government the line of demarcation as they had agreed on it earlier.42 Thus, the French note of December 21, 1918, sanctioning Czech occupation of the Czech lands, contained also a description of the demarcation line between Hungary and Slovakia, noting that the Hungarians had already withdrawn behind that line. Thus the French note declared a fait accompli in the case of Slovakia's annexation to Czecho-Slovakia.43

The French acted alone, without seeking the approval of the Allies, in the matter of changing the terms of the Belgrade armistice and, by doing so, northern Hungary up to the Danube river was incorporated into Czecho-Slovakia. When the Peace Conference came to deal with the Czecho-Slovak boundary issues, the Czech delegation could claim the territory on the basis of self-determination or ethnic rights and insist that the boundary of the new state corresponds to the military demarcation line agreed between Benes and Marshal Foch in December 1918.

The information about the new demarcation line reached Slovakia shortly before Christmas. On December 24, Hodza gave the Budapest government a note saying that in view of the guidelines issued by the Commander of the Eastern Allied army, the demarcation line must be in accord with "the historical boundary of Slovakia" and that the Slovak territory has to be evacuated up to the boundary line stated by Dr. Benes in Paris toward the end of November. This boundary line was clearly defined in the note as first following the Danube, than Ipel' up to Rimavska Sobota, then in direct line to the mouth of Uh river to Latorice and then along the Uh river toward the Uz pass.44 The Hungarian government protested against this demarcation line and insisted on the line of December 6 agreement.

Since the Hungarian government was unwilling to evacuate the southern Slovak districts including the cities of Bratislava and Kosice, the Czechs used military force. With the borderlands of the Czech lands secured, the Czech troops, including those which had arrived from Italy and France and the Czech and Slovak volunteers, were directed to Slovakia. Commanded by the Italian General Luigi Piccione,

the Czecho-Slovak armed forces entered Bratislava on January 1, 1919, making it possible for the provisional Slovak government, headed by Vavro Srobar, to move into that city on February 4.45 Kosice was occupied already on December 28, and the so-called National Council of Eastern Slovakia that had proclaimed the establishment of Eastern Slovak Republic in Presov on December 14, had a very short life. The Czecho-Slovak forces completed the occupation of Slovakia in January 1919. Even the Slovak National Council was disbanded on January 20, 1919, so that there would be no other authority than the Srobar-led provisional government.46

The Hungarian government temporized, hoping to save Slovakia through promises of autonomy and expecting the peace conference to make a more favorable decision than the one made by the French government in December 1918. Yet the Entente powers supported the Czecho-Slovak claims. On March 20, 1919, Vix delivered the Hungarian government another note according to which the Conference of Ambassadors in Paris decided to make a neutral zone whose new demarcation line would go some 50-80 kilometers deeper into Hungary.47 The note was an ultimatum and the Hungarians were to comply with it within thirty hours. According to Vix, the new demarcation line was to represent also the new political boundary and left no doubt that Hungary lost Slovakia for good. The Prime Minister of Hungary declared that his government cannot accept the conditions contained in the note and, therefore, had to resign. This paved the way for the arrival of the Bela Kun government and the war that followed.

Although the Czecho-Slovak government did not want war with Hungary, the ministry of national defense issued on April 7, 1919, an order to occupy the territories assigned by the Ambassadors' Conference to Czecho-Slovakia. The army, under the command of Generals Piccione (Italian) and Hennoque (French), was to carry out the mission without bloodshed. Due to the Romanian deep penetration into Hungary, a part of the country, adjacent to the territory assigned to Czecho-Slovakia and below the demarcation line, was evacuated by the Hungarian troops. The Czecho-Slovak troops occupied this area, "since anarchy was developing there."48 In addition, Ruthenia, that was to become a part of Czecho-Slovakia, had to be occupied too. (Its attachment to Czecho-Slovakia brought about the separation of Hungary from Poland and it also linked Czecho-Slovakia with Romania.) Later a controversy developed

over the occupation of the territories below the demarcation line and General Piccione was blamed for misjudging the Hungarians' ability to fight back.

Since the Romanians secured their positions in Hungary, the Czecho-Slovak front was the "weakest link" in the "capitalistic encirclement" of the People's (Soviet) Republic of Hungary led by Bela Kun. Although a Bolshevik, he emphasized the need to recapture the lost territories, and the Hungarian nationalists supported him in this respect. The Hungarian offensive began on May 20. The Czecho-Slovaks were taken by surprise; at times their retreat became a flight, especially when they ran out of munitions and supplies. The Czecho-Slovaks overextended themselves in April and now they had to abandon one position after another. In June the Hungarians were in control of Kosice, where they were welcomed as liberators, and even threatened Bratislava. About two thirds of Slovakia came under their control; in eastern Slovakia they penetrated up to Bardiejov, thus separating the eastern Czecho-Slovak army from the western army and from the Romanian army. The aim of the Bela Kun offensive was the establishment of a junction with the Red Army in the Western Ukraine.49

After the occupation of Kosice, the short-lived Slovak Soviet Republic, headed by a Czech Bolshevik, Antonin Janousek, was proclaimed. Janousek attempted to establish contacts with the left-wing Czech Social Democrats and to gain the sympathy of the president of Czecho-Slovakia, Masaryk, but he failed on both counts. The republic collapsed when the Hungarian troops had to leave Kosice.50

The Czech defeat in May and June brought about a change in the command of the Czecho-Slovak army in Slovakia. General Piccione was succeeded by the French General Maurice Pelle who ordered reorganization of the armed units.51 With the help of volunteers and fresh troops Pelle was able to start an offensive in the Nitra area on June 7. On that day the Hungarian government received a telegram from the French Prime Minister Clemenceau, demanding immediate cease-fire lest he impose drastic measures on Hungary.52 Following Kun's conciliatory reply, Pelle' stopped the offensive. But since the Hungarians did not cease hostile actions along the whole front, Pelle' resumed the offensive. While the Czecho-Slovaks recaptured positions in western Slovakia, the Hungarians pushed toward the Polish border in an attempt to establish a junction with the Red Army. But the latter could not defeat both the Poles and the Romanians and,

therefore, was unable to render any effective assistance to the Hungarian army.53

On June 13 the Allies at the peace conference decided the definite boundary between Czecho-Slovakia and Hungary and related the decision to Hungary and all the other interested parties, emphasizing that further bloodshed will not help to obtain boundary advantage to any of the states concerned.54 Defeated on the diplomatic front and unable to win on the military fronts, the Hungarian government, eventually, accepted the Allied ultimatum. Beginning June 30, Slovakia was gradually evacuated. Soon thereafter, the regime of Bela Kun collapsed.

Early in August 1919 Romanian troops occupied Hungary and on August 21 the new Hungarian government issued a decree on national minorities according to which all Hungarian citizens, regardless of their language or ethnic background, were equal. The use of native language by anyone was protected and, in general, the decree contained almost all that the oppressed nationalities in Hungary had demanded in the past.55

Once more, before the signing of the Treaty of Trianon that had to determine definitely the boundaries of Hungary with Slovakia, the Hungarian government attempted to formulate its relations toward the nationalities which were lost. After the testimony of Cardinal Csernoch and Admiral Miklos Horthy, the Hungarian government accepted a proposal for Slovak autonomy. (It was not made public at that time.) According to this proposal, Hungary would grant the Slovak nation a broadly based autonomy that would give the latter the possibility of an unlimited cultural development and jurisdiction in all matters which did not directly concern the over-all state interests.56 Thus, the Slovak-inhabited "Upper Hungary" would be an autonomous, self-governing province consisting, in accordance with the ethnic principle, of all the predominantly Slovak and the immediately neighbouring districts. The definite boundary of Slovakia would be determined by a commission composed of Slovaks and Hungarians after the signing of the peace treaty.57 The detailed and far-reaching proposal, not published until 1929, came too late. The Peace Conference decided to attach Slovakia to Czechoslovakia.

The signing of the Treaty of Trianon on June 4, 1920 did not end the Czechoslovak-Hungarian dispute. The post-Bela Kun nationalist government of Hungary was headed first by Archduke Joseph and then by Admiral Miklos Horthy who was duly elected Regent (State

Administrator) on March 1, 1920. Law I of 1920 formally reestablished monarchical form of government and made possible for the Habsburgs to press their claim to the Hungarian throne. The Horthy government signed the Treaty of Trianon and the latter was formally ratified by the National Assembly, but the ratification was accompanied by protests against the injustice of the terms imposed on the humiliated nation. Indeed, there were Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia representing an irredenta. Therefore, to assure the full compliance with the Treaty of Trianon, the Czechoslovak government concluded a treaty of alliance with Yugoslavia on August 14, 1920.58

On January 27, 1921, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, Benes, declared that the restoration of ex-Emperor Charles or his son Archduke Joseph of the Habsburg dynasty "would be a real casus belli for several of Hungary's neighbors."59 In discussing the recent history of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations he pointed out that after the collapse of the Bela Kun government, when Archduke Joseph took over the government, "it was the Czechoslovak Government in particular which opposed this with the greatest resoluteness and succeeded in rendering his regime impossible." However, it was the Ambassadors' Conference that passed a resolution on February 2, 1920, against a return of the Habsburg dynasty. Among other things, the resolution specifically declared that the restoration of the Habsburgs "would be in conflict with the very basis of the peace settlement and would be neither recognized nor tolerated by them."60

These declarations notwithstanding, Charles of the House of Habsburg, the last reigning monarch in the former Empire, returned to Hungary on March 27, 1921, in order to assume his royal duties. But the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav alliance helped to frustrate the restoration coup in Budapest.61

Charles' claim to the throne was based on the assumption that his act of suspending his reign and renouncing all share in the government did not constitute a formal abdication as both Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary, since under the law of the land, the Act of Abdication, an abdication must be countersigned by the Prime Minister and ratified by both Houses of Parliament. Some leaders in Budapest seized upon the alleged invalidity of the abdication and claimed that the Treaty of Trianon itself was not valid, since Charles still was the legal King of Hungary and he neither signed it nor was he bound by it.62 When Romania joined

Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in objecting to the restoration of the Habsburg monarch in Hungary, and the Conference of Ambassadors (that is, the Great Powers) backed up the three states, Charles had to leave Hungary. Less than three weeks after the event Czechoslovakia and Romania signed a convention of alliance. Later Romania and Yugoslavia signed a similar convention and the formal groundwork of the Little Entente was laid.63

In view of the fact that Hungarian minorities lived in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, and Hungary lost territories to all three of these countries, the Little Entente's purpose was to preserve the peace settlement, especially its territorial provisions. Restoration of Habsburgs would threaten the status quo as established by the Treaty of Trianon, or, as Benes put it in an article, "the presence of any Habsburg is completely incompatible with the aims of the Little Entente, since his reappearance would mean fight, eventual decomposition and collapse of the new order and, therefore, an inevitable war of all against all."64

Shortly after the article appeared in print, Charles made a second return to Budapest in October 1921. This time Czechoslovakia declared mobilization and the Little Entente announced that strong measures would be taken against Hungary. The swift action by the Little Entente, especially the Czechoslovak mobilization, brought about a reproof from the Conference of Ambassadors.65 The Great Powers' intervention forced the ex-King to leave Hungary' the second time.

Yielding to pressures from abroad, the Hungarian National Assembly passed the Habsburg Dethronement Act on November 6, 1921.66 The action did not imply, however, the Hungarian acceptance of the dismemberment of the thousand year-old-state. Therefore, the Little Entente's avowed purpose was to preserve the peace settlement, though its existence was also justified on several other grounds.67

When Hungary agreed to adhere to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, the Little Entente leaders looked upon it as a step in the right direction and did not pay much attention to the moral reservations the Hungarian government expressed while accepting the principle of renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. In those reservations, reference was made to the injustice of the Trianon settlement for which "the reparation ... will be secured along peaceful lines."68

The Czechoslovak-Hungarian dispute, as any event that has

multiple causes, long lasting consequences and wide-ranging effects on different groups of people, may be seen and analyzed from different points of view. Leaving aside the moral, cultural and other issues involved in the case, the political aspects of the dispute may be summarized as follows: Czechoslovakia was recognized as a victorious power by the Allies and was represented at the Peace Conference, while Hungary was one of the vanquished countries to whom such representation was denied. Territorial claims of the former country were supported by France even before the peace conference dealt with the boundary question.69 Thus, Czechoslovakia was able to present itself as a state possessing all the attributes of statehood when the conference dealt with the matter. It had a recognized government able to enter into diplomatic relations with other states, it had a population and a defined territory that was under effective control of the government and, above all, it was recognized as an allied country. In contrast to it, Hungary's government was not recognized by France and it had to accept the decisions made in Paris. Rightly or wrongly, the terms of the Treaty of Trianon were justified by the victorious powers on the grounds of self-determination of the Slovaks and the economic and security needs of Czechoslovakia. Hungary's loss was Czechoslovakia's gain.69

Notes

1. The best known English language works on Slovakia are: Robert W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Czechs and Slovaks (London, 1943); Racial Problems in Hungary (London, 1908); Slovakia Then and Now (London-Prague, 1931); The New Slovakia (Prague, 1924). Also, Jozef Kirchbaum, Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe (New York, 1960); Jozef Lettrich, History of Modern Slovakia (New York, 1955); G. L. Oddo, Slovakia and Its People (New York, 1960); and Jozeph A. Mikus, Slovakia, A Political History: 1918-1950 (Milwaukee, 1963).

2. Frantisek Bokes, Dejiny Slovenska a Slovakov [History of Slovakia and the Slovaks] (Bratislava, 1946), p. 339.

3. In the exile documents and all the documents 0f the Paris Peace Conference Czechoslovakia's name (and that of Czecho-Slovaks) was hyphenated. When the Czechoslovak Constitution of February 29, 1920, established a unitary and centralistic state, the hyphen was deleted. In this essay the name will be used with and without the hyphen. Among the many books on the Czech and Slovak independence movement abroad one may

mention Karel Pichlik, Zahranicni odboj 1914-1918 bez legend [Resistance Abroad, 1914-1918, Without Legends] (Prague, 1968).

4. Bokes, pp. 354-55.

5. For Masaryk's own account of his activities abroad see T. G. Masaryk, The Making of a State; Memories and Observations, 1914-1918. An English version arranged and prepared with an introduction by Henry Wickham Steed (New York, 1927). The most extensive works on the independence movement at home are books by Milada Paulova, Dejiny Maffie, odboj Cechu a Jihoslovanu za svetove valky, 1914-1918 [History of the Maffie, Resistance of Czechs and Yugoslavs during the World War, 1914-1918] 2 vols. (Prague, 1937); and Tajny vybor [Maffie] a spoluprace s Jihoslovany v letech 1916-1918 [The Secret Committee [Maffie] and Collaboration with Yugoslavs during the Years 1916-1918] (Prague, 1968).

6. Karol A. Medvecky, Slovensky prevrat [Slovak Revolution], 4 vols. (Trnava, 1930-31), III, p. 347.

7. Bokes, p. 359.

8. On the end of the Empire see Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1929); and Jan Opocensky, Konec monarchie rakousko-uherske [The End of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy] (Prague, 1928). Space limitations do not allow the citation of all relevant sources.

9. Bokes, pp. 360-61.

10. Ibid., pp. 361-62.

11. Ibid., p. 363; Medvecky, I, p. 347.

12. Text of the Declaration is in Medvecky, III, pp. 364-65.

13. Before the text was published in newspapers. Dr. Milan Hodza made a few changes in it and the original has not been preserved. See Bokes, pp. 364-65; also Mikus, pp. 9-11; Medvecky, I. p. 346.

14. Milan R. Stefanik, a French naturalized citizen and an officer in the French army, was very helpful to Masaryk as was the Czechoslovak army in Siberia. The latter strengthened the Czecho-Slovak position at the peace conference. Stefanik never returned to Slovakia alive; he died when the plane that departed from Rome, carrying him and several Italian officers, crashed near Bratislava on May 4, 1919. See Medvecky, I. pp. 90-104; also Bokes, p. 365.

15. Bokes, pp. 368-69.

16. Ibid., p. 369.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid., pp. 370-71.

21. Ibid., p. 371.

22. Many Slovaks had their own understanding of the word "freedom"

and behaved accordingly. Medvecky gives countless examples of looting of Jewish stores and inns. Most of the well-to-do Jews in Slovakia were identified with the Hungarian ruling class and were victimized during the revolutionary time. See Medvecky, III, pp. 3-186.

23. Military Convention Between the Allies and Hungary, signed at Belgrade, November 13, 1918, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), PPC, 1919 II (Washington, 1942), pp. 183-85, Also Bohdan Krizman, "The Belgrade Armistice 13 November 1918," The Slavic and East European Review (48, 1970), pp. 67-87. Text of the document is in ibid., pp. 85-87.

24. Karel Kramar, Reci a projevy [Speeches and Statements]. Edited by Frantisek Stasek and J. R. Marek. (Prague, 1935), pp. 22-26; also Vladimir Sis, ed., Dr. Karel Kramar. Zivot-dilo-prace. Vudce naroda [Dr. Karel Kramar. Life-Work-Labor. Leader of the Nation] (Prague, 1936), pp. 203-204.

25. Eduard Benes, ed., Svetova valka a nase revoluce, Dokumenty [The World War and Our Revolution, Documents] III (Prague, 1929), p. 509.

26. The Czecho-Slovak army in France was established by a French government decree in December 1917 and the Czecho-Slovak army in Russia, consisting largely of former prisoners of war, was ordered to join the army in France by Masaryk in February 1918. The French government granted Masaryk credits for maintaining and transferring the army from Russia to France. The latter never arrived in France, because in May 1918 it got involved in a conflict with the Bolsheviks. After it occupied the Trans-Siberian Railroad and began to move westward into the Volga region, the Allies recognized the Czecho-Slovak National Council. Similarly as the British recognition of August 8, the United States recognition of September 3, 1918, was based on belligerency of the Czecho-Slovak armies in Russia, Italy and France. By a secret agreement of September 28, 1918. the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris gave the French government "the cooperation of its armies for the pursuit of the present war," and the French government made a commitment to support the Council in its efforts to reconstitute an independent Czecho-Slovak state "with borders of its former historical lands," and accorded "to the Czechoslovak nation the right to be represented at the inter-Allied conferences, where questions concerning the interests of Czecho-Slovaks will be discussed," The complete document is in Karel Kramar, Reci a projevy, pp. 89-92.

27. Benes, III, pp. 496-98.

28. Vladimir Sojak. ed., O ceskoslovenske zahranicni politice v letech 1918-1939 [On Czechoslovak Foreign Policy during the Years 1918-1939] (Prague, 1956), p. 43.

29. The armistice document is in Harry Rudolph Rudin, Armistice, 1918 (New Haven, 1944), pp. 406-409. See also Supreme War Council, Resolutions,

VIII Session, Fourth Meeting, November 4, 1918, Bliss Papers.

30. Bokes, p. 371.

31. The Czechs had a conflict with the Poles over the Teschen territory; this tied down a considerable number of their troops in the area.

32. See 26 above.

33. Bokes, pp. 372-73.

34. Ibid., pp. 374-76.

35. Eduard Benes, Svetova valka a nase revoluce II [World War and Our Revolution] 2 vols. (Prague, 1927-1928), pp. 484-55.

36. Ibid., p. 501.

37. D. Perman, The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State; Diplomatic History of the Boundaries of Czechoslovakia, 1914-1920 (Leiden, 1962), pp. 92-93.

38. Bokes, p. 375,

39. Perman, p. 93; Bokes, pp. 375-76.

40. Benes, II, pp. 493-94,

41. Benes, III, pp. 534-35; Benes, II, pp. 495-96

42. Benes, II, p. 497; Perman, p. 94.

43. Perman, p. 94.

44. Bokes, p. 376.

45. Ibid., p. 380.

46. Ibid., p. 378.

47. Ibid., p. 382. For details see Peter Pastor, "The Vix Mission in Hungary, 1918-1919: A Re-examination." Slavic Review (Vol. 29, No.3, September 1970), pp. 494-97.

48. Bokes, p. 383; Perman, p. 221.

49. Bokes, p. 384. Also V, Kholodkovsky, "Toward the Lenin Centenary: Socialist Community--A Retrospect," New Times, no. 30, July 30, 1969.

50. On the Slovak Soviet Republic see Martin Vietor, Slovenska sovietska republika v r. 1919 [The Slovak Soviet Republic in 1919] (Bratislava, 1955); V, Semyonov, "An Historian Looks Back: The Slovak Republic of Soviets," New Times, no. 25, June 25, 1969; chapter two in Josef Kalvoda, Czechoslovakia's Role in Soviet Strategy (Washington, D.C., 1978), pp. 21-31.

51. Bokes, p. 384.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.,, pp. 384-85; Perman, pp. 225-26.

55. Bokes, p. 385.

56. Ibid.

57. Ibid., p. 385-87.

58. Eduard Benes, Problemy nove Evropy a zahranicni politika ceskoslovenska, Projevy a uvahy z r, 1919-1924 [Problems of New Europe

and Czechoslovak Foreign Policy. Statements and Thoughts from Years 1919-1924] (Prague, 1924), pp. 83-90.

59. Ibid., p. 114. The whole speech of January 27, 1921. was published in English. See The Foreign Policy of Czechoslovakia, Speech of Dr. F. Benes, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the House of Deputies, January 27, 1921. (Prague, 1921), esp. p. 19.

60. Ibid., in Czech, pp. 114-15; in English, p. 20.

61. John O. Crane, The Little Entente (New York, 1931), pp. 9-10.

62. Ibid., p. 6.

63. Ibid., p. 10

64. The article appeared in the September 1921 issue of Revue de Geneve, no.1; its Czech translation is in Benes", Problemy nove Evropy, pp. 131-40.

65. Crane, pp. 11-12.

66. Ibid., p. 18. The text of the act is on p. 213 (Appendix D).

67. Benes, Problemy nove Evropy. pp. 83-90.

68. Crane, p. 38.

69. The peace conference rejected the Czecho-Slovak claims to Lusatia and the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav corridor that would separate Hungary from Austria. The formation of the corridor was strenuously opposed by the Italian delegation and except France, none of the Allies favored this claim. A complete set of the Czecho-Slovak memoranda presented at the peace conference is in the Hoover War Library, Stanford, California.

Forrás: www.hungarian-history.hu

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British Role in Assingning Csallóköz
MAP-Az etnikai Szlovenszko, 1918
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